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CAGE v. LOUISIANA
111 S. Ct. 328 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On April 16, 1986, Tommy Cage attacked two college students
wearing medallions on gold chains. When one of the students
attempted to flee, Cage shot him in the lower back with a .38 caliber
gun. The jury found that Cage then fatally shot the victim in the head,
took the medallion, and ran into a nearby housing project. As a result,
the Louisiana trial court convicted Cage of first-degree murder and
sentenced him to death.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Cage argued that
the reasonable doubt instruction used in the guilt phase of his trial was
constitutionally defective under the United States Supreme Court
opinion In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the accused
is protected against conviction under the fourteenth amendment
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged). The instruction
Cage challenged stated in relevant part:
If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element
necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty
to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of
not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a prob-
ability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt,
however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is
founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon
mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as would
give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by
reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or
lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible
doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a
reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is
not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral
certainty. State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39,41 (La. 1989) (em-
phasis added).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that "taking the
charge as a whole, reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence would
understand the definition of 'reasonable doubt."' Id. The United States
Supreme Court granted Cage's petition for a writ of certiorari, and in
aper curiam opinion, vacated Cage's sentence and remanded the case
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that the wording of the jury instruction
could lead a reasonable juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof
lower than that required by the Due Process Clause. The Court
reasoned that "the words 'substantial' and 'grave,' as they are com-
monly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required
for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard." Cage v. Louisi-
ana, 111 S. Ct. 328,329-330 (1990). When those words are consid-
ered with the requirement that the defendant be found guilty by a
"moral certainty," as opposed to an evidentiary certainty,jurors could
easily find the defendant in this case guilty.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In this case the Court returned to a previously employed standard
of review for ambiguous jury instructions: A standard different from
the one only recently announced in Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct.
1190 (1990). See case summary of Boyde v. California, Capital De-
fense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 11, (1990). The Cage Court held that
when reviewing an ambiguous jury instruction, the Court should
consider "how reasonable jurors could have understood the charge as
a whole." Cage, 111 S. Ct. at 329. This standard is consistent with the
approach previously established in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985). Conversely, the Boyde Court had framed the question as
"whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the
challenged jury instructions in a way that prevents the consideration
of constitutionally relevant evidence." Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1196.
The Virginia Supreme Court, when reviewing challenged jury
instructions, has also engaged in the "taking the charge as a whole"
analysis which the Louisiana Supreme Court utilized in upholding
Cage's conviction. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court has said
that even though a challenged instruction was not artfully drawn, "we
are of the opinion that, read as a whole, it fairly expounds the thrust
of the statute." M. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 480, 248
S.E.2d 135, 150 (1978), Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 360
S.E.2d 352 (1987), Turnerv. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543,364 S.E.2d
483 (1988), Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d
757 (1989), Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275,384 S.E.2d 785
(1989). This standard response, that the instruction "read as a whole"
is fair, did not prevail in the Cage decision.
The former Boyde standard of review, that examined the likely
manner in which the jury as a whole applied the challenged instruc-
tion, made it more difficult for the defendant to obtain relief. Thus,
the U.S. Supreme Court's apparent return to a "reasonable juror"
evaluation standard may indicate that the Court will be more willing
to examine potentially unconstitutional jury instructions.
Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas
GASKINS v. MCKELLAR
916 F.2d 941 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Donald Henry Gaskins, who was serving ten life sentences, nine
of which were for murder, was convicted and sentenced to death for
the capital murder of fellow death row inmate Rudolph Tyner.
Gaskins appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court which affirmed
both his conviction and sentence. State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 326
S.E.2d 132 (1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985). Gaskins'
subsequent efforts to obtain state post-conviction relief also failed.
See Gaskins v. State, No. 85-CP-40-3466, Letter Order (S.C. Jan. 7,
1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987).
Gaskins sought federal review under 28 U.S.C. §2254 (1990) in
the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The
district court denied the writ without an evidentiary hearing. Gaskins
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then initiated this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
HOLDING
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of an
evidentiary hearing on Gaskins' habeas petition and the dismissal of
his petition for failure to show entitlement to federal collateral relief.
Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941 (1990). While Gaskins asserted
several grounds for relief, the holdings of the Fourth Circuit which
may be of particular interest to Virginia attorneys are the following:
(1) the trial court's refusal to exclude a juror for cause did not violate
Gaskins' sixth amendment right to an impartial jury even though the
juror admitted during voir dire that, in his opinion, Gaskins should
have been sentenced to death for his prior unrelated murder convic-
tions; (2) the trial court's instructions to the jury on the standard of
proof necessary to convict, which equated reasonable doubt with a
substantial doubt, did not violate due process; and (3) testimony
during the sentencing phase concerning Gaskins' prior-vacated death
sentence did not violate the eighth amendment.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
(A) JURY SELECTION
Gaskins unsuccessfully challenged one juror for cause but did
not use an available peremptory challenge against him. That juror
admitted on voir dire that in his "honest opinion... [Gaskins] was
found guilty of those earlier murders, [and] he should have been
executed at that time." Gaskins, 916 F.2d at 949 (brackets in original).
Additionally, the juror stated that "if Gaskins were found guilty of
Tyner's murder, and that if it were shown that Gaskins had killed
before, [the juror] would be predisposed to impose a death penalty."
Id. After reviewing the juror's voir dire testimony, the Fourth Circuit
held that the districtjudge did not err in concluding that the juror could
be impartial. Relying on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968),
the Fourth Circuit declared that the most that can be asked of a jury
member is that he not be "irrevocably committed" to one view of
capital punishment. Gaskins, 916 F.2d at 949 (quoting Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).
However, Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 810 (1985) superseded
Witherspoon. In Witt, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a less stringent
standard to exclude a juror for cause, asking only whether the juror's
view would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties in accordance with his instructions and oath." Id. In addition,
the Court declared that the judgment of a trial court will be entitled to
a presumption of correctness. Id.
While the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Witherspoon, which has
not been overruled but only superseded, may not be wrong, it raises
the issue of what standard the Virginia and other Fourth Circuit courts
will apply in the future, particularly whether the court will find that
prospective jurors who oppose the death penalty are nevertheless
qualified unless one expresses an irrevocable commitment against it.
See Balske, The Demise of the Witherspoon Test and Other Important
Developments inDeath-PenaltyDefense, The Champion, April, 1985,
for a full discussion of how Witt changed the Witherspoon standard for
exclusion of potential jurors.
(B) JURY INSTRUCTIONS - STANDARD OF PROOF
The trial court, in its instructions to the jury, defined reasonable
doubt, the absolute standard of proof necessary to convict, as "a doubt
for which you can give a reason[,] [i]t is a substantial doubt." Gaskins,
916 F.2d at 952 (brackets in original). Gaskins asserted that this
definition relieved the prosecution of proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt as required by In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970), in violation of due process. Gaskins, 916 F.2d at 952.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a definition such as this
could be confusing. Indeed, the court stated that at some point, "a
reasonable doubt definition may be so incomprehensible or potentially
prejudicial that it requires reversal." Id; see also United States v.
Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (1985). However, after reviewing the
context of the entire instruction in conjunction with other jury in-
structions, the court held that the trial judge's use of a lower standard
of proof was not "likely to mislead the jury into finding no reasonable
doubt, if there was some in fact." Gaskins, 916 F.2d at 952 (quoting
Smith v. Bordenkircher, 718 F.2d 1273, 1277 (1983)).
Since the Fourth Circuit opinion in Gaskins, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed a conviction where a reasonable juror could have
interpreted the reasonable doubt instruction to allow a finding of guilt
based on a degree of proof below that required by due process. Cage
v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 328 (1990). See case summary of Cage v.
Louisiana, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. The trial court provided
ajury instruction strikingly similar to the one given in the present case
which equated reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt. Just as in
Gaskins, the appellate court similarly argued that, taking the instruction
as a whole rather than out of context, reasonable persons of ordinary
intelligence would understand the definition of reasonable doubt.
Cage, 111 S.Ct. at 329 (quoting State v. Cage, 554 So.2d39,41 (1989)).
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court decided Cage after Gaskins
was convicted and while he was seeking habeas review. It remains to
be seen whether Gaskins will now get the benefit of this decision. In
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Supreme Court adopted a
theory of retroactivity which bars retroactive application of court
decisions which break new legal ground or whose "result was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final." Id. The purpose of the "new rule" doctrine is to
promote finality based on faithful application of well established
constitutional standards existing at the time the case is heard, even
though later decisions may modify these standards. Butler v. McKellar,
110S. Ct. 1212(1990). Seecasesummary ofButlerv.McKellar, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 (1990).
An alternative basis for relief exists for Gaskins. In Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a jury
instruction that shifted the burden of persuasion on the element of
intent was not harmless error where the intent was at issue and the
state's evidence on intent was not overwhelming. Similarly, where it
is the jury's duty to convict only if the state has proven its case beyond
a reasonable doubt, lowering the standard of proof can not be harmless
error. Arguably, Cage was "dictated" by Winship and Francis.
(C) SENTENCING - INTRODUCTION OF
ARBITRARY FACTORS
During the penalty phase of Gaskins' trial, the state introduced
evidence of Gaskins' prior death sentence, vacated when the South
Carolina Supreme Court declared its death penalty statute unconsti-
tutional. Gaskins argued that this information implied that, regardless
of whether Gaskins should be sentenced to death for the murder of
Tyner, the jury could properly reimpose the earlier death sentence,
vacated, after all, on a technicality. Gaskins, 916 F.2d at 954. Gaskins
argued that this testimony introduced arbitrary factors in the sentencing
decision in violation of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
(introduction of a victim impact statement or evidence describing
personal characteristics of the victim, the emotional impact of the
crime on the victim's family, and the family members' opinions and
characterizations of the crimes and the defendant violates the eighth
amendment because this information is irrelevant to the sentencing
decision).
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Even though this third claim did not succeed, the Fourth Circuit
agreed that "evidence of a prior-vacated death penalty is of limited, if
any, relevance to the jury's decision whether to impose the death
penalty." Id. However, the court held that this information was not
so "constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing
process" as to rise to a Booth violation. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983)).
South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), supports the
even broader proposition that comments made by the prosecution to
the jury about the victim's character are irrelevant to the sentencing
decision and a violation of the defendant's eighth amendment rights.
"For the purposes of imposing the death penalty.., the defendant's
punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral
guilt." Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2210 (quoting Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982)). It seems reasonable to argue that any evidence,
including evidence of a prior vacated death sentence, which does not
relate to a heightened degree of personal culpability is also irrelevant.
This theory of relevancy is only true of information about Gaskins'
previous sentences, and obviously does not apply to revelation of
Gaskins' prior murder convictions.
Both Booth and Gathers were 5 to 4 decisions with different
Court memberships. During this past term, the U.S. Supreme Court
as currently constituted initially agreed to reconsider Booth and
Gathers in Ohio v. Huertas, 1991 WL 3926 (U.S.). However, the
Court ultimately dismissed the state's petition for certiorari as im-
providently granted and failed to rule on the Ohio Supreme Court's
finding that admission of victim impact evidence violated the
defendant's constitutional right to have the sentencing decision made
by the jury and judge.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. McInerney
EVANS v. MUNCIE
916 F.2d 163 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Wilbert Lee Evans shot and killed a deputy sheriff while attempt-
ing to escape from state custody. He was convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death in 1981. This sentence was vacated when the
Commonwealth confessed error on the sentencing proceedings. A
new jury was impaneled and subsequently recommended the death
penalty based upon a finding of "future dangerousness." Evans v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 468, 323 S.E.2d 114 (1984).
Evans was denied relief at the state habeas level, and in his first
federal habeas petition. Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117 (4th Cir.
1989); see also case summary of Evans v. Thompson, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 10 (1989). After his second habeas petition
at the federal level, the district court for the Eastern District of
Virginia granted a stay of execution. The Commonwealth appealed
this decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit vacated the stay of execution.
HOLDING
Evans raised two claims in support of his motion to stay his
execution. His first claim was that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments prohibit the execution of a defendant when his behavior
subsequent to sentencing casts doubt upon the existence of the sole
aggravating factor supporting the death sentence. Evans also asserted
that the Commonwealth violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments
by refusing to provide a forum to hear and decide his first claim. Evans
presented, for the purpose of demonstrating that he lacked the ag-
gravating factor of "future dangerousness," evidence that he was
instrumental in protecting the lives of prison employees during an
escape attempt by several death row inmates.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that these claims constituted "new rules" which federal courts may not
use in collateral proceedings to overturn a final state conviction. The
court also held that his claims did not allege a constitutional violation
remediable by a federal court.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The "new rule" doctrine states that "habeas corpus cannot be
used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all
defendants on collateral review." Teague v.Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
The Teague Court defined a new rule as one "not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 489
U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original). The purpose of the "new rule"
doctrine is to allow state courts to issue their decisions based upon a
faithful application of well established constitutional standards existing
at the time the case is heard, even though later decisions may modify
those standards. Butlerv. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990); see
also case summary, Butler v. McKellar, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
3, No. 1, p. 2 (1990).
In the instant case, the Fourth Circuit determined that Evans was
asking for a new rule. However, Evans purposely phrased his claim
in a manner that he hoped would place it within one or both of the
recognized exceptions to the Teague new rule doctrine. Nonetheless,
the court found that neither of the exceptions applied. While the
Fourth Circuit's holding may be correct, the reasoning employed
deserves some discussion, particularly with regard to future cases.
The first exception to Teague is substantive in that it allows the
application of a new rule on collateral review if the new rule places
"certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe." Evans, 916 F.2d at 166, quoting Teague,
489 U.S. at 311. According to the Fourth Circuit, Evans' claim
advocated the new rule that "the Constitution requires a state to
reestablish the validity of an error-free sentence because a prisoner
desires to present character evidence based on his post-sentencing
conduct." Evans, 916 F.2d at 165. On that characterization of his
claim, the court held that the first exception had nothing to do with the
new rule being sought.
The claim that Evans put forward could have received deeper
analysis. A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court stated
that the first exception includes cases where the imposition of a
particular form of punishment is prohibited on a certain class of
individuals. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2952-53 (1989). The
irrelevance of a first exception claim by Evans seems less apparent
when it is phrased in terms of Penry. The more favorable charac-
terization of Evans' claim is that he belongs to a class of persons who
may not be executed. His specific argument is that the Constitution
protects individuals sentenced to death solely upon the aggravating
factorof future dangerousness if theirconduct subsequentto conviction
demonstrates a lack of future dangerousness.
At this writing, however, the Court has recognized only one post-
sentence occurrence that can spare death sentenced prisoners from
